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The Journal of Religion
Catholic teleologists. They are more comfortable viewing a principle of justice
in conflict with the notion of promoting the good. Cahill, however, makes clear
(as others in that tradition have done) that the common good is not a quasiutilitarian principle striving to maximize net utility. It is something much
richer. It accommodates concern for justice and the priority for the poor.
Whether it would be better to hold out a separate, nonteleological principle
like justice is a matter for further debate.
ROBERT M. VEATCH, Georgetown University.
HITCHCOCK, JAMES. The Odyssey of the Religion Clauses. Vol. 1 of The Supreme Court
and Religion in American Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
232 pp. $29.95 (cloth).
HITCHCOCK, JAMES. From “Higher Law” to “Sectarian Scruples.” Vol. 2 of The Supreme Court and Religion in American Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004. 272 pp. $35.00 (cloth).
In volume 1, James Hitchcock provides a comprehensive historical treatment
of all the U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the religion clauses. He also
discusses Supreme Court cases not technically dealing with the religion clauses
that substantially impact religious liberty, including cases involving church
property, religiously affiliated colleges, and internal church disputes. Rather
than providing a technical legal treatment, he focuses mostly on a historical
narrative of the cases. He seems to want the Supreme Court case narratives
and the justices’ opinions to speak for themselves. The first seven chapters
begin and end with very sparse analysis of how the cases affect legal doctrine,
conceptions of religious liberty, or the larger society. The conclusion, however,
provides some analysis of these issues and identifies how the Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses has changed. Consequently, except for Hitchcock’s discussion of Supreme Court cases involving church property, religiously
affiliated colleges, and internal church disputes, volume 1 will be mostly beneficial for those scholars not familiar with the Supreme Court’s religion clause
cases.
Volume 2 focuses on the broader “context of the continuing dialogue about
the role of religion in public life” and its relationship to the Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses (1). The first part of Hitchcock’s argument focuses on challenging the predominantly separationist reading of the framers’
original intent that began in 1947 with Everson v. Bd. of Education, which was
the first Supreme Court case applying the establishment clause to a state law.
Hitchcock argues that “the 1947 separationist claim concerning original intent
was seriously flawed in that it assumed that the opinions of Jefferson and Madison alone determined that intent, prescinded from the views of virtually all
other Framers, exaggerated Jefferson and Madison’s own degree of separationism, and ignored the realities of the religious establishment as they existed
in America from the beginning” (110). Moreover, Hitchcock maintains that
the separationist reading of the religion clauses constitutes “the abandonment
in law of the moral authority of Christianity” (136).
Alternatively, Hitchcock claims that in “most of the history of the country
until after World War II [i.e., after Everson] . . . the importance of religion in
public life was largely taken for granted” (133). He argues that this is consis-
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tent with an “alternative account” of Locke that was adopted by the founders
who “were able to construct a Christian model of a republic” (133). This Christian republic entailed “a secular government but a Christian society” where
“religion [was] regarded as essential for inculcating in citizens those virtues
that alone make self-government possible” (133). Thus, he concludes that
through most of its history “the Court merely assumed that religion [i.e., Christianity] was to be encouraged as a positive social benefit,” because “the moral
basis for American democracy was civil religion combined with natural law”
(133, 135).
While Hitchcock astutely identifies an alternative reading of the Court’s preEverson views on the role of religion in society, his critique of separationist
readings of the religion clauses is less persuasive. Hitchcock’s argument seems
to confuse two overlapping but distinct debates—the debate about the proper
interpretation of the religion clauses and the debate about the proper role of
religion in public life. For example, on page 128, he begins a paragraph by
criticizing “the incoherence of the modern jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses” because it treats religion as “irrational.” To support this observation,
the next sentence observes that “some separationists insist that believers refrain from offering religious reasons for their positions and stipulate that believers can legitimately participate in public discussion only to the degree that
they propose ‘accessible’ secular (or ‘public’) reasons” (128). In the first sentence, he is referring to a separationist interpretation of the religion clauses.
Conversely, in the second sentence, he is referring to Robert Audi’s philosophical arguments about the ethical and political grounds for the separation
of church and state in a liberal constitutional democracy. Certainly these two
debates often influence one another and sometimes overlap, but Hitchcock
often treats them as one debate. This confusion is further magnified by his
frequent generic references to “separationists” and “liberalism” without specifying the details of the particular understanding of separation or liberalism
that he is referring to and by lumping disparate forms of separation and liberalism offered by numerous scholars together as a single entity.
Despite this confusion, Hitchcock clearly argues that the contemporary separationist views of the religion clauses and the secular understanding of the
state offered by liberalism are inconsistent with the Framer’s original understanding of the religion clauses and their views about the role of religion in
public life. Hitchcock’s argument suggests that there are only two choices: a
Christian republic or a republic based on “comprehensive liberalism.” For example, by keeping religion out of public schools, he maintains that “religion
is irrelevant to contemporary life” (153). “Liberalism has moved toward becoming a secular orthodoxy that places believers in the situation where a minimal understanding or religious liberty excludes them from full participation
in public life” (159). “Thus not only are churches to be made to conform to
law and public policy, liberal values are required to be internalized by those
who wish to have a legitimate place in society” (148).
Given his rejection of a republic based on comprehensive liberalism, Hitchcock suggests that the original understanding of our country as a Christian
republic should be normative. Hitchcock’s argument, however, has two problems. First, it fails to show that a Christian republic is the only alternative
to comprehensive liberalism. His argument appears to equate the process of
secularization with the ideology of secularism. In Jeffrey Stout’s new book Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), Stout
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argues that the fact that most ethical discussion in the public square is secularized (“not ‘framed by a theological perspective’ is taken for granted by all
those who participate in it”) “is not a reflection of commitment to secularism,”
that is, an ideology that competes with religious traditions for ultimate commitment (93). In other words, a separationist interpretation of the religion
clauses does not necessarily presuppose an ideology of secularism (e.g., comprehensive liberalism). Stout emphasizes that a secularized modern democratic
discourse does not “involve endorsement of the ‘secular state’ as a realm entirely insulated from the effects of religions convictions, let alone removed
from God’s ultimate authority. It is simply a matter of what can be presupposed
in a discussion with other people who happen to have different theological
commitments and interpretive dispositions” (Stout, 97). Consequently, Hitchcock’s critique of comprehensive liberalism as a “secular orthodoxy” does not
rule out the possibility of a republic with a secularized public square that recognizes and encourages citizens holding a plurality of religious commitments
and that is consistent with a separationist interpretation (or some other interpretation) of the religion clauses.
In addition, Hitchcock’s argument fails to present persuasive reasons why
we should revert back to the framers’ interpretation of the religion clauses
and their Christian understanding of the republic. Even if we grant his historical argument, Hitchcock fails to provide an argument for why the “original
intent” of the framers should be the controlling interpretative approach. The
Constitution does not include interpretative rules requiring that it be interpreted according to the text and the framers’ intent. Interpreters must choose
whether to rely on the framer’s intent, the text of the Constitution, Supreme
Court precedent, prudential consequences, ethical concerns, natural law principles, or some combination of these factors. In fact, his emphasis on the framers’ intent suggests a formalistic legal positivism (the meaning of the religion
clauses is a determinate fact) that would substantially exclude the natural law
principles he claims are part of the moral basis of American democracy.
Despite these concerns, both volumes make an important contribution to
the historical understanding of religious liberty in America. They reveal an
alternative reading of the framers’ understanding of the religion clauses and
of the role of religion in public life. Hitchcock also persuasively establishes
that legal issues beyond the religion clauses (e.g., church property, religiously
affiliated institutions, and internal church disputes) are central to understanding religious liberty in America.
MARK C. MODAK-TRURAN, Mississippi College, School of Law.
HEINZE, ANDREW R. Jews and the American Soul: Human Nature in the Twentieth
Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. xvi⫹438 pp. $29.95
(cloth).
In Jews and the American Soul, Andrew Heinze considers the influence of Jewish
figures, both intellectual and popular, on the formation of American attitudes
toward the psyche. Assuming a historical perspective reaching from the late
nineteenth century to the turn of the millennium, he traces the Jewish contributions to the concept of the psyche and popular understandings of psychoanalysis.
By positing a coherent set of “Jewish values” held by both secular and reli-
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